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Abstract 
This article critically assesses the potential for the international regulation of Temporary Agency Work 
(TAW) through the use of Transnational Private Labour Regulation (TPLR). Given the limits of existing 
national and international regulation of TAW, particularly in developing countries, and the current 
deadlock in dialogue through the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the argument of this article is 
that TPLR offers a unique opportunity to break this regulatory deadlock and establish a basis for dialogue 
between the Global Union Federations (GUFs) and major Private Employment Agencies (PrEAs). This 
article goes on to propose three potential platforms for partnership that, although compromised, are 
transparent, fair and sufficiently elastic to accommodate the distributive and political risks associated with 
partnership. They also offer important gains, namely increasing the competitive advantage of the PrEAs 
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involved, securing minimum standards for agency workers and ‘field enlarging’ strategies for the GUFs 
and their affiliates.   
!
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Introduction 
Externalisation (Theron, 2005) is the trend of obtaining labour from outside of a corporation’s 
boundaries, linked to the strategies of outsourcing and contracting out, signifying a triangulation of the 
employment relationship with the introduction of a third party (ILO, 2009a). Although data continues to 
be imprecise about the scale and nature of these changes (Eurofound, 2008), over the last thirty years 
externalized labour has expanded dramatically in regions such as Asia, Latin America and Central Europe 
(ICEM, 2004; IMF, 2007; Woolfson, 2007). This development is, in part, driven by the demand for 
flexible labour (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013) and the ‘staggeringly uniform’ (Rubiano, 2013) 
ways in which multinational companies (MNCs) have organized international business operations leading 
to indirect and precarious employment relations systems (De Vos, 2009; Evans and Gibb, 2009; ILO, 
2009a; 2009b). Employment in firms contracted to MNCs is associated with a ‘decoupling’ (Hayter and 
Ebisui, 2013) of work from employment, leading to an absence of labour protections (Aviles, 2009; 
Bentein and Guerrero, 2008; Bercusson and Estlund, 2008; Bronstein, 2009; Gallagher and Sverke, 2005) 
such as unfair dismissal, Freedom of Association and the right to bargain collectively (ILO, 2009b; 
Rubiano, 2013) and by precarity and insecurity (Author A; Doogan, 2009; Standing, 2010).  
Transnational Private Labour Regulation (TPLR) has grown in response to three regulatory 
deficits that underpin externalized employment in developing countries. First, there is a lack of enforced 
employment legislation in these countries (Kolben, 2011; Trubek and Trubek, 2007); second, MNCs have 
found it difficult to manage their global supply chains in developing and transition economies (Fichter 
and Sydow, 2002); third multilateral organisations such as the ILO do not have the capacity to implement 
and monitor international standards in developing and transition economies (Blanpain and Colucci, 2004).  
These deficits have triggered a growth of global governance mechanisms and regulatory initiatives from 
international non-state and private sectors (Bercusson and Estlund, 2008; Ruggie, 2008) including trade 
unions and their international organisations, the Global Union Federations (GUFs).  TPLR is regulation 
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that is supplementary to existing national legislation (Lobel, 2004; Trubek et al., 2000), “governance 
without government” (Stoker, 1998) involving private companies, employers associations, unions and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Its growth has closely tracked the increase in the global 
activities of MNCs and the broad failure of domestic labour legislation, particularly in developing 
countries, in adapting to them (Kolben, 2011). 
The focus of this article is the regulation of temporary agency work (TAW), a relatively distinct 
and formal category of externalized labour and one that, therefore, offers some potential for developing 
minimum standards.  This article presents three international frameworks as a basis for setting minimum 
standards for temporary agency workers through partnership between key international organisations, 
Private Employment Agencies (PrEAs) and the GUFs. These three approaches are not mutually exclusive 
nor alternatives to stronger labour protections (Trubek and Trubek, 2007) rather they offer compromised 
but viable entry points for building dialogue between key international employers and trade unions.   
There are an estimated 12.4 million full time job equivalents and 46 million people working 
globally for an estimated 176,000 PrEAs (CIETT, 2013). The growth of TAW is indicated by the size of 
PrEAs themselves, with Adecco, Randstad and Manpower representing some of the largest multinational 
companies in the world with total 2011 annual sales revenues estimated at €259 billion, thirty per cent of 
which is concentrated in ten multinational companies based predominantly in the USA, Japan and 
Western Europe (CIETT, 2013).  
A central strategic objective of the PrEAs is to build TAW as a sector, and secure competitive 
advantage in new markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America by establishing a minimum 
set of industry standards.  The major user enterprises of agency labour are also MNCs, themselves keen to 
raise their capacities to manage often complex global supply chains involving large-scale use of TAW 
(Mitlacher and Burgess, 2007). The PrEAs are therefore highly active, principally through their 
professional associations  - CIETT and EuroCIETT - in attempting to establish minimum industry 
standards.  
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Trade unions, however, do not regard the growth of TAW as a positive development; rather they 
see it as increasing the trend towards the ‘Hindustanisation’ of employment relations (Greenfield, 2009) 
and directly responsible for the erosion of permanent jobs and decent work (Fashoyin, 2010; Forde and 
Slater, 2005; ILO, 2009b). Trade unions, therefore, face a dilemma about whether to focus strategies on 
protecting agency workers, and precarious workers more broadly, or adopt strategies that protect workers 
from precarious work forms (Demaret, 2013). This dilemma is felt acutely by unions attempting to 
organize young workers, migrant workers and women, who represent the majority of those working in 
precarious conditions (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). Trade unions, principally through the 
coordination of the GUFs, have since the late 1990s been active on ‘precarious work’ which is considered 
an important ‘field-enlarging’ strategy (Wever, 1998: 392) for building and reviving trade union 
organization. In many workplaces, such as the mining sector, the use of contract and agency labour is 
widespread and many unions prioritize organizing them as a matter of organizational  survival (Author A; 
ICEM, 2004), utilizing a broad range of international regulations, capacity building programmes and 
coordinated solidarity action (Author A).  
Despite clear motivation on both sides to secure international minimum standards for TAW, 
dialogue between the major PrEAs and the GUFs has resulted in a regulatory deadlock arising from their 
failure to manage the inevitable political and distributive risks involved (ACTRAV, 2011). One of the key 
obstacles for dialogue has been the lack of mutual “commitment to business interests” (Martinez Lucio 
and Stuart, 2005: 798and subsequent failure to establish a model of partnership that provides sufficient 
elasticity to tolerate the diverse attitudes towards TAW of the social partners (ACTRAV, 2011).  
Given the influence and scope of the largest PrEAs and the international regulatory role of the 
GUFs (Author A) there are strategic gains in focusing on partnership between this limited group of actors. 
There are also significant distributive and political risks involved, including the risk of sanctioning 
actions and practices which undermine legitimacy with their respective memberships, heightened in the 
case of the GUFs where affiliates hold diverse attitudes towards PrEAs (Holdcroft, 2013). As a result, this 
article argues that such partnership should be framed as ‘transitional’ or ‘coerced’ (Martinez Lucio and 
Stuart, 2005) providing limited partnerships that focus on strategic points of conflict and interest only but 
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with concrete benefits for both sides. Although  compromised, these partnerships can be adopted where 
strategic alliances are required but where there are no alternative ways of establishing them.   
This article further argues that existing TPLR mechanisms provide important potential 
frameworks for such partnerships. The content of most TPLR mechanisms represents only the currently 
accepted minimum standards for companies as defined by the United Nations (Ruggie, 2008) offering a 
highly elastic model of partnership that does not require any substantial political agreement.  Further, 
TPLR mechanisms provide an efficient basis for partnership because they are established and therefore 
regarded as transparent (Cooke, 1990). This article goes on to propose three potential frameworks for 
partnership including International Framework Agreements (IFAs),  an ‘industry’ standard and 
international dialogue through the Council of Global Unions which each offer concrete gains to the 
partners. 
The next section briefly describes the research methods, followed by a theoretical section about 
international regulation and TPLR. This is followed by a case study about TAW with a concluding 
discussion about the potential for partnership between PrEAs and the GUFs.   
!
!
!
Research Methods 
The prevailing data collection technique used in this article is participant observation by the 
author (Myers, 1999). This provides an insider’s viewpoint of the work of the GUFs as well as an insight 
into contemporary events and the attitudes of the actors and organisations involved (Iacono et al., 2009).  
The research is based on the author’s experience as ***********  during the period 1999-2007. 
The author was directly responsible for developing and commissioning the first global union project on 
contract and agency labour in 2003, funded by the Swedish LO TCO and Dutch FNV Mondiaal, which 
continues to the present involving unions in Africa, Latin America, Western Europe, North America, 
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Eastern and Central Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia and Asia. Part of this project was to set up 
the first database of union responses to contract and agency labour and the commissioning of the first 
GUF research on the situation of contract and agency workers in the energy, chemical and extractive 
industries (ICEM, 2004). Additionally the author was responsible for creating the first multi-GUF 
coordinating group on the issue of precarious work in 2005 and commissioning research to assess the 
potential for developing a multi-GUF platform for action and negotiations with key multinational 
companies, both user enterprises and PrEAs (Martin, 2006).  
 The participant observations (Darke, Shanks and Broadbent, 1998) are supplemented by public 
and official documents and archival records, GUF project and activity reports, online publications, 
presentations at seminars and conferences and ILO conference reports. Particular use has been made of 
ACTRAV reports and their analysis of the regulatory deadlock.  
The ideas contained in this article have their genesis in an iterative process with practitioners at 
two seminars that were held at ******  University in January 2010 and September 2012 that focused on 
precarious work and regulation. Representatives from the IUF, ICEM and IMF (now Industriall), TUAC 
and CIETT actively participated at these seminars.  The author was also invited to present the emerging 
ideas contained in this article to Randstad’s Public Relations board, Euro-CIETT and CIETT leadership in 
Nice in July 2011. Each of these three events were followed up with e-mail correspondence and telephone 
conversations with CIETT’s general secretary, representatives of the IUF, ICEM and IMFand trade unions 
in South Korea, Thailand and Colombia. 
This position of ‘industry practitioner’ (Iacono et al., 2009) provides unique access to data and 
insight into the current regulatory deadlock that is not currently available through academic research, and 
therefore offers a small contribution for both practitioners and academics involved in this important area 
of work.  
!
International regulation of Temporary Agency Work (TAW)  
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A regulatory approach to externalized labour has inherent weaknesses (Gallagher and Sverke, 2005; 
Aviles, 2009) because much existing national labour legislation is “left without an object” (Tsogas, 
2009:87). In many national contexts, externalized labour is set up precisely to avoid labour protections 
(McCann, 2008) by placing the employment relationship outside the scope of existing labour law leaving 
temporary agency workers vulnerable to exploitation (ILO, 2009b). Regulations affecting TAW can be 
usefully divided into three main groups (Demaret, 2013): restriction of short-term contracts;  restriction of 
the reasons for employing people on temporary contracts; and minimizing the economic savings for 
employers. This third category includes legislation that promotes equal pay for temporary workers as well 
as increasing the operational costs for PrEAs (Keune, 2013).  
There exists an understandable preference amongst trade unions for national legislative responses 
to TAW however the weakness of national institutions, particularly in developing countries, has led to an 
emphasis on international regulation at the level of the European Union (EU) and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). This preoccupation with precarious work is reflected in the United Nation’s recent 
prioritization of enforcing the Ruggie Principles (Ruggie, 2008) and ‘due diligence’ in global supply 
chains. One of the most important regulations to date is the European Temporary and Agency Workers 
Directive, which broadly introduces the principle of equal treatment for temporary agency workers into 
European and national legislation (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Mitlacher and Burgess, 
2007). Different institutional contexts have led to diverse impact, with the key criticism of the Directive 
concerning the exploitation of permitted derogations from the principle of equality of treatment (Keune, 
2013) leading to a rapid increase in new unions and collective agreements  and large scale negotiations of 
permanent contracts for temporary workers on lower rates of pay in companies including companies such 
as Tesco, DHL, Carlsberg and Morrisons (Rossman, 2013).   
There are a number of international recommendations and conventions established through the 
ILO that have been used to support labour rights of temporary agency workers. These include the ILO’s 
Recommendation 198 on the employment relationship, an important articulation of the changes taking 
place in employment relations and the duties of states to establish the legal responsibilities of employers. 
The ILO’s Private Employment Agencies Convention 181 and recommendation 188 require governments 
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to create legal and other protections for agency workers, establish mechanisms for agencies to be 
officially registered and protect freedom of association and collective bargaining. Additionally the GUFs 
have made use of the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association to secure rulings on behalf of contract 
and agency workers, most recently in Colombia and South Korea (Author A; Holdcroft, 2013).  
Good use of the OECD guidelines has also been made in the case of contract and agency workers 
by the IUF, the GUF representing workers in the food, agriculture and tourism sectors.  In 2009, the IUF 
made a complaint against Unilever to the OECD UK National Contact Point on behalf of contract and 
agency workers in two Pakistani plants, Khanewal and Rakhim Yar Khan. The IUF since 2008 had run an 
international ‘Casual Tea’ campaign and coordinated solidarity action with affiliates in Pakistan, 
Australia, Russia, the Netherlands, Hungary, the Philippines, Australia, Uruguay, South Africa and the 
Dominican Republic (Rossman, 2013).  The OECD set up negotiations between the IUF and Unilever 
over claims that they had breached worker rights on pay and freedom of association, settling the disputes 
by creating over two hundred permanent positions for the contract and agency workers and establishing 
for the first time international dialogue between Unilever and trade unions. The  IUF had carried out 
many years of capacity building projects for affiliates in Pakistan, which allowed for a close working 
relationship between them as well as a capacity for dialogue with Unilever management. This case 
highlights the important role of the solidaristic and educational work of the GUFs in building union 
capacity in developing countries to make use of international regulation (Author A). 
In addition to international regulation through intergovernmental organisations, TPLR 
mechanisms are increasingly used by the social partners, stimulated by the increase in the global activities 
of MNCs and the broad failure of domestic labour legislation  in adapting to them (Kolben, 2011). TPLR 
operates through MNCs and other transnational non-state actors, including the GUFs, using their different 
motivations (Hassel, 2008).  TPLR is a “dialogic” (Braithwaite, 2006) allowing  MNCs to engage with 
trade unions on the basis of minimum standards making them highly elastic but with increased legitimacy 
because of the potential for partnership with a wide group of "accountability actors" (Lansbury, 2009). 
Additionally TPLR addresses the "temporal asymmetry" (Benner et al., 2004) that exists between the rate 
of growth of TAW and the length of time needed to secure new international regulation and an 
“opportunity to overcome regulatory deadlocks” (Hassel, 2008:232). TPLR is however a "compromised 
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outcome" (Bartley, 2007) for trade unions because it does not address the basis of the employment 
relationship directly and therefore leaves the political disagreements about TAW between trade unions and 
PrEAs unresolved. 
TPLR mechanisms include International Framework Agreements (IFAs), signed agreements 
between GUFs and multinational employers that have been adopted as a major part of the industrial 
GUFs’ strategies (Author A; Müller and Rüb, 2005). The "institutional foundation" (Anner et al., 2006) of 
these agreements, and much of the GUFs’ work, is located within their powerful affiliates from Western 
Europe. It is on the basis of this institutional framing that leverage with MNCs exists and it is how 
international agreements can be negotiated and secured (Author A). IFAs offer the potential for 
establishing stable dialogue with employers on both fundamental principles, namely the ILO’s Core 
Labour Conventions, and more substantive issues such as health and safety (Hammer, 2005). Importantly 
for TAW, contained within some IFAs there is express agreement that the use of permanent direct 
employment is preferred, including Norske Skog, Aker, Vallourec, GDF Suez and GEA AG. For some of 
the GUFs, principally Industriall, there is a strategic intention to strengthen this language for suppliers 
and subcontractors within the IFAs.   
A new TPLR agreement is the Temporary Work Charter signed between the Volkswagen Group 
and Industriall in December 2012, which establishes principles for the use of temporary work. The 
agreement commits Volkswagen to limit the use of temporary work to a maximum of five per cent of the 
workforce, along with the principle of equal pay and access to training, representing a significant 
development for trade unions and their capacity to act on the issue of TAW. It remains to be seen if the 
Charter can be negotiated with other MNCs, particularly those headquartered outside of Germany, but 
because of the importance of contract and agency labour to the GUFs' key affiliates these kinds of 
initiatives are likely to be a priority for the foreseeable future (Hayter and Ebisui, 2013). 
International regulation has well-understood limitations both in terms of legitimacy and 
enforcement (Stoker, 1998; Braithwaite, 2006), particularly where local trade unions lack sufficient 
leverage with employers to influence their implementation (Hale, 2008). The implementation of these 
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agreements varies greatly and the evidence in developing countries is not strong (Thorpe and Mather, 
2005). However, where the GUFs invest in solidarity and education activities to build the capacity of 
affiliates in developing countries we see higher levels of implementation (Author A). For example, some 
IFAs involve systems of joint monitoring such as the IKEA agreement signed with the IFBWW that has 
led to a notably high level of corrective actions in developing countries (Eurofound, 2008; IFBWW, 
2004). A further generic criticism of these international regulatory mechanisms is that they are inherently 
weak in terms of content, establishing only minimum standards and excluding probably the most 
important protections needed by temporary agency workers such as protection from unfair dismissal. 
Although these criticisms are valid, the argument of this article is that TPLR, when used by 
unions that are involved in capacity building activities, offers a unique opportunity to break the current 
regulatory deadlock and establish a basis for dialogue between trade unions and major PrEAs. 
Additionally, that the established nature of the GUFs’ TPLR work provides a transparent and fair entry 
point for further dialogue with PrEAs in a way that could offer currently unachievable gains to both sides.  
!
Temporary Agency Work (TAW) Case Study 
Trade unions face difficult choices about how to respond to the increase in TAW between 
protecting temporary agency workers  or protecting workers from precarious work forms (Demaret, 
2013). Across different institutional contexts there has been a growing acceptance that unions have to 
adapt to changes in the employment relationship in order to sustain memberships and structures, often 
involving shifts in union constitutions and ideologies. As a result protective strategies towards traditional 
union membership as historically seen in the industrial unions of Continental Europe and the public 
sectors, are often combined with unions protecting temporary agency workers through inclusion in 
collective bargaining and creating separate union structures (Heery, 2004). Union adaptation to the reality 
of TAW has involved major campaigns and educational activities to encourage traditional memberships to 
support these changes, often appealing to principles of solidarity and protection of vulnerable workers 
(Author A; Hayter and Ebisui, 2013; ICEM, 2004; IMF, 2007). 
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Because of the importance of multinational companies in driving the growth of TAW and the 
relative lack of union capacity to address it, much of the work of trade unions particularly those in 
developing and transition economies has been driven by their international organisations, the GUFs. The 
political orientations of the GUFs towards MNCs vary, from “cooperative engagement” exhibited by 
UNI, to “militant opposition” (Bacon and Blyton, 2004) often exhibited by the IUF. There continues to be 
clear political and organisational differences between GUF affiliates  about how to position themselves in 
relation to TAW such that there is no unified international trade union strategy on TAW. However, 
although their attitudes towards PrEAs vary, their commitment to securing minimum standards for 
workers does not; and all of the GUFs pursue engagement with MNCs in order to fulfil their basic 
functions.  
As well as the GUFs’ TPLR activities, an important part of their TAW work involves research, 
campaigning and educational projects aimed at exchanging experience between unions often funded by 
Dutch, Nordic and German trade unions (Author A). Examples include Industriall’s Stop Precarious Work 
Now campaign and the research work of UNI’s TAW Unit. Most of the GUFs coordinate large-scale 
capacity building programmes focused on transferring knowledge and experience between unions about 
how to respond to TAW as well as international solidarity action including long-term campaigns in 
Thailand and South Korea (Holdcroft, 2013). 
!
The importance of the GUFs’ capacity building activities for implementing international 
regulation is worth exploring here. One example is the work of Industriall (previously the ICEM), the 
GUF representing workers in the mining, energy, metals and chemicals sectors. The initial aim of the 
Industriall’s Contract and Agency Labour (CAL) project, started in 2003, was to build union capacity to 
respond to the growth of contract and agency labour at a time where there was  a widespread belief 
amongst affiliates that atypical workers could not be organised.  Over time, the project attempted  to 
secure dialogue with multinational employers on their use of contract and agency labour and facilitate 
exchange between affiliates organizing in the same MNCs. The project involved research (ICEM, 2004) 
on the use of contract and agency labour in Industriall sectors, in response to the information deficit that 
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existed at that time.  
The CAL project allowed Industriall to carry out important union building activities in developing 
and transition economies, including Colombia (Author A), a country with high political significance for 
the GUFs.  Industriall has strong solidaristic links with its affiliates in Colombia built since the mid-1990s 
through trade union education programmes funded by the Swedish trade unions (Author A).  These 
educational projects had allowed ICEM affiliates in Colombia to create awareness within their 
memberships about the moral and strategic importance of taking a ‘field enlarging’ (Wever, 1998) attitude 
towards organizing contract and agency workers. Led by the mining union Sintracarbon, despite operating 
in a hostile union environment affiliates adopted  a policy of organizing contract and agency workers and 
establishing dialogue with key multinational user enterprises (Author A).  
The exchange of experience and strategies between Industriall affiliates was significant in 
providing viable strategies to do this, in particular the successful organising experience of the Peruvian 
mining union FNTMMSP. As a result, Sintracarbon has been able to organise contract and agency 
workers in six companies operating in the Cerrejón mine, something that would not have been possible 
without this articulation between international and national unions. This example highlights the important 
capacity building work that is needed to make use of international regulation by unions in developing 
countries and the unique role of the GUFs in facilitating this.  
Turning to the PrEAs, the drive for international regulation is primarily market-led (Bartley, 
2007). PrEAs have, understandably, been active in building a corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
agenda to promote a distinction between their operations and the worst forms of exploitation of agency 
workers (ILO, 2009c). Although the social impact of the growth in TAW is contested (Author A; Doogan, 
2001; Standing, 2011) social attitudes towards PrEAs are a growing area of concern for them. As the 
major PrEAs look to expand their markets into Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia, they are keen to 
establish friendly relations with national and international trade unions that are well represented in these 
countries in a way that they currently are not (Randstad, 2010a; 2010b). A big part of the PrEAs’ CSR 
agenda has been the relaunch and development of the international and European employers’ associations, 
CIETT and EuroCIETT, and their own codes of conduct over the last eight years. The PrEAs have also 
actively participated in dialogue within the ILO, attending events and campaigning for the ratification of 
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C181 as well as securing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Union Network International 
(UNI), the GUF representing unions in the service sectors  (ILO, 2009c).   
It is important to note here that Randstad, the Dutch MNC and the second largest PrEA in the 
world, is a major driving force in the development of both EuroCIETT and CIETT, particularly the work 
of Annemarie Muntz, Director of Group Public Affairs of Randstad and President of EuroCIETT and Fred 
van Haasteren, CIETT President and Executive Vice President of Social and General Affairs of Randstad. 
This may in part reflect the Dutch employment relations culture (De Jong et al., 2007) facilitating a 
relative openness to international standards and dialogue with the GUFs. 
Despite their CSR activities, the  problem remains for the PrEAs of how to secure dialogue with 
the GUFs  in such as way as to “eventually reform relations into a more open system of 
negotiations” (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005:809). This problem relates to two critical events, the first 
involving the signing of an MoU between CIETT and UNI in 2008. Despite inclusion of the core labour 
standards and a commitment to promote international negotiations, quite unexpectedly for an agreement 
signed by a GUF it commits the signatories to remove legal and administrative barriers to TAW. 
Additionally the MoU represents a strategic error because temporary agency workers operate across all 
sectors such that the exclusion of all the other GUFs radically undermines both the regulatory scope and 
implementation of the agreement (Hale, 2008; Stoker, 1998). In addition, the MoU has created a degree of 
embarrassment and bad feeling within the GUFs, working both as a block to securing broader 
international agreement, and raising doubts as to the real commitment of CIETT corporate members to 
engage with the GUFs (Rossman, 2013).  
There also exists a regulatory deadlock at the level of the ILO due to the breakdown of dialogue 
between the GUFs and the PrEAs through the Tripartite Global Dialogue Forum on the Role of Private 
Employment Agencies in Promoting Decent Work and Improving the Functioning of Labour Markets in 
Private Services. Despite initial participation in the forum, set up by the ILO in 2009 to promote 
international dialogue and regulation of TAW, the most recent forum held in October 2011 did not reach 
any points of consensus or future action. This is in part explained by the forum’s attempts to secure 
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political agreement about the role of TAW in economic development and create a sectoral approach to 
TAW, thus creating a ‘sectoral straightjacket’ (ACTRAV, 2011) for dialogue. Adopting a sectoral approach 
to TAW is one that CIETT is keen to maintain as it provides members with a sectoral identity that, they 
believe, offers some degree of competitive advantage with user enterprises and the ILO.  However, this 
sectoral approach has, like the CIETT/UNI MoU, effectively restricted partnership to a small number of 
organisations resulting in limited regulatory scope.  
This leaves the PrEAs and the GUFs with both political and strategic problems of how to get out 
of this deadlock and initiate meaningful international partnership. 
!
Discussion 
Partnership between the GUFs and PrEAs threatens significant distributive and political risks to 
both sides (Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2005). Distributive risks include material and environmental costs 
such as the impact of increased flexibility on work intensification and conditions. Political risks include 
organizational practices and legitimacy, particularly heightened in the case of the GUFs with diverse 
memberships. However, increased occupational and societal precarity has become a factor in shaping our 
attitudes and expectations of work security (Doogan, 2009; Standing, 2001) such that the risks for trade 
unions not addressing the working conditions of temporary agency workers potentially become greater 
than the risks of adaptation including partnership with PrEAs.  
One of the key obstacles to partnership relates to the mutuality of business interests where trade 
unions often have a clear preference for permanent and direct employment and do not support the growth 
of PrEAs. Given this fundamental difference of position, only limited partnership between the PrEAs and 
GUFs can realistically be established. Two models for limited partnership are Martinez Lucio and Stuarts’ 
(2005) ‘transitional’ and ‘coerced’ partnerships, what they call ‘marriages of convenience’ and ‘shotgun 
weddings’. Transitional partnerships focus on specific risks and challenges, are reciprocal but temporary, 
and do not attempt to change the management or employment relations systems in place. This is in 
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contrast to a coerced partnership that focuses collaboration at a critical point when a strategic alliance is 
required by both parties. These partnerships are characterized as being leadership driven and ‘elite-based’, 
that may attempt to control dissent rather than offer a fully dialogic model. Clearly compromised, these 
partnerships are often adopted where there are no alternative ways of establishing specific outcomes such 
as minimum standards for TAW.  
The argument of this article is that TPLR mechanisms offer a way for GUFs to establish 
partnerships with PrEAs on either a transitional or coercive basis as a way of opening up negotiations 
with employers in developing countries where local trade union capacity and leverage does not exist.  
Further that these mechanisms provide a realistic basis for partnership because they offer gains for both 
sides and processes that are regarded as fair and efficient (Cooke, 1990).  
The first model of TPLR that we can draw on is International Framework Agreements (IFAs). 
With over eighty signed IFAs to date (Author A), they offer an established and therefore transparent way 
for PrEAs and GUFs to structure their partnerships. Their content can be considered ‘fair’ by both sides as 
it is exclusively based on accepted minimum standards that the PrEAs and the GUFs have individually 
signed up to through their existing activities. This means that the principles included in IFAs do not pose 
any political risk to the PrEAs or the GUFs.  
A key advantage of an IFA is that it offers an efficient way for PrEAs to reach agreement with a 
number of GUFs. Co-signed IFAs exist; GDF Suez, UMICORE, Lafarge and EDF, which raises the 
possibility of securing an IFA across a wider group of GUFs, something required to overcome the current 
‘sectoral straightjacket’. This again increases the benefits of using an IFA because it allows individual 
PrEAs to secure partnership with a wider number of GUF’s than has so far been possible thus increasing 
legitimacy.  The mutual gains of an IFA are that PrEAs can  boast an inclusive model of partnership with 
their international counterparts and for GUFs the first signed agreement on minimum standards and trade 
union rights for TAW.  
A second, more involved model of TPLR is an industry level agreement, certification and 
inspection system administered by the ITF in the shipping sector. This system, in partnership with the 
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international sectoral employers’ organisations, the International Maritime Employers’ Committee 
(IMEC) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF), sets both wages and conditions for seafarers 
making it the only genuinely international collective bargaining agreement in existence (Koch-
Baumgarten, 1998). The system is well funded by ship owners who join the scheme, providing one of the 
few examples of adequately resourced monitoring of an international agreement. This agreement came 
about because ITF affiliates delegated responsibility for negotiating with employers to the ITF, because of 
low density in labour providing countries (Anner et al., 2006).  The shipping sector has specific 
characteristics, but ones that it shares with TAW in that both have workers that are largely unorganized 
and work in locations not managed by their employers. It means that there is a similar regulatory deficit at 
the level of the workplace that could, potentially, be addressed through a derogation of organizing and 
bargaining power to international level.    
As with IFAs, because of the credibility of this partnership model it scores highly on transparency 
and efficiency. The gains for PrEAs relate to an industry standard’s ability to secure clear market 
differentiation between those companies with a commitment to minimum standards, something that poses 
a distributive risk to PrEAs in the current economic climate. For GUFs the gains could be the 
establishment a well-funded system of inspection and monitoring of working conditions of temporary 
agency workers, something that has never been achieved outside of Western Europe. One question about 
this model of partnership is whether a sufficient number of PrEAs, CIETT and the GUFs would agree to 
participate. Some of the other GUFs have experience of industry initiatives and agreements, including 
mining, chemicals, tobacco and cocoa, however these have previously been single GUF initiatives. 
Additionally, the buy-in of the PrEAs would be influenced by the willingness of CIETT and its corporate 
members to engage in an initiative that was not restricted to partnership with service sector unions, 
something which they have to date been reluctant to do (ACTRAV, 2011).  
A third and final entry point into partnership could be to establish dialogue between PrEAs, 
CIETT and the global unions through the Council of Global Unions. The GUFs have a long history of 
cooperation and relationships are generally solidaristic but with institutional coordination through the 
ITUC being difficult (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000). In response to this problem of coordination, in 2006 
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the Council of Global Unions was formed, with an experienced international trade unionist, Jim Baker, as 
Coordinator. This represented an attempt to find a practical way for the GUFs to coordinate their work 
without having to continually address the thorny question of the ITUC’s role vis-a-vis the GUFs. The 
Council is not a structure as such and is not heavily resourced, but it has coordinated an agreement on the 
Global Union Principles on Temporary Work Agencies (2010), the first joint GUF position on TAW.  In 
the first section there is a political  statement that the primary form of employment should be permanent, 
open-ended and direct, and more substantive principles including the right to have a written contract of 
employment, state regulation of PrEAs, and protections for migrant workers. The principles include an 
important articulation of the ILO's core conventions of freedom of association and right to collective 
bargaining that require agency workers should have the right to both join a union and also be part of the 
same bargaining unit as the direct employees of the user enterprise where they are working. This is an 
insistence on the right to collective bargaining with the user enterprise, rather than just the agency that 
employs them. This is the key issue of tension concerning the principles between CIETT and the GUFs, 
however, there remains significant consensus on the main body of the principles and therefore some 
potential for common ground (Demaret, 2013).  
The advantage of PrEAs entering into dialogue with the GUFs through their own principles and 
the Council of Global Unions is that it is a pragmatic response to a highly complex institutional context. 
The GUFs have struggled to reach consensus on the issue of TAW and the principles are the most 
advanced formulation of common ground so far. Much of the difficult work of establishing a basis for 
dialogue between the GUFs has now been done through the Council, offering PrEAs a potentially 
efficient way to initiate partnership with all of the GUFs. 
!
!
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Conclusion        
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This article has attempted to address the regulatory deficit of TAW and the current deadlock in 
international negotiations between the PrEAs and the GUFs.  Using Martinez Lucio and Stuarts’ 
‘transitional’ and ‘coerced’ partnerships it has been argued that a limited model of partnership could offer 
important gains to both sides while at the same time managing the political and distributive risks 
involved. Further, that partnership could be structured using established TPLR mechanisms already used 
by the GUFs. This article has presented three possible entry points for partnership between PrEAs and the 
GUFs. These are to secure a multi-GUF IFA, establishing an industry standard co-administered with the 
GUFs and a less structured option of entering into dialogue with the GUFs through the Council of Global 
Unions and the Global Union Principles on Temporary Work Agencies. 
Because of the minimum human rights basis of these mechanisms they also provide a framework 
for partnership with sufficient elasticity to allow for global unions and employers to enter into partnership 
without having to secure political agreement. As a result, the political risks to partnership are reduced 
offering a pragmatic although compromised model of partnership. Additionally it has been argued that 
partnership offers concrete gains to both parties. Namely the potential for PrEAs to secure competitive 
advantage through minimum standards for temporary agency workers, principally in developing countries 
where their markets are growing. For the GUFs and their affiliates partnership could secure minimum 
standards for temporary agency workers as well as ‘field enlarging’ strategies for trade union 
organisations.  
The proposals are made in part because they are mechanisms that already exist, providing some 
established frameworks within which international dialogue between unions and employers could take 
place. This could not only break the current regulatory deadlock but potentially secure minimum 
standards within a relatively short time frame thus addressing the ‘temporal asymmetry’ of the slow 
process of international regulation of a fast developing form of externalized labour. These three 
approaches are not mutually exclusive nor do they offer a comprehensive solution to the political and 
operational problems of international regulation, rather the aim has been to offer entry points for 
partnership between PrEAs and the GUFs.  
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